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CALIFORNIA'S MICRA: THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
In an effort to reduce the costs underlying medical malpractice
insurance premiums, the California legislature enacted the Medi-
cal Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). MICRA
divests medical malpractice victims of traditional protections gov-
erning personal injury litigation while granting broad immunity to
negligent health care providers. The constitutionality of several of
MICRA's tort reform provisions was recently upheld in four Cali-
fornia Supreme Court cases. This Comment examines the discrim-
ination wrought by MICRA and shows how its sweeping reforms
undermine California's policy of fault-based liability. The Cali-
fornia legislature is called upon to amend MICRA. This Com-
ment provides numerous suggestions for its revision.
INTRODUCTION
In 1975 the California legislature enacted the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA),1 divesting medical malprac-
1. Ch. 1, § 1, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. 3949. In calling for the legislature to
enact MICRA, the Governor of California, in his proclamation convening the legislature
in Second Extraordinary Session, stated in part:
The cost of medical malpractice insurance has risen to levels which many phy-
sicians and surgeons find intolerable. The inability of doctors to obtain such
insurance at reasonable rates is endangering the health of the people of this
State and threatens the closing of many hospitals. The longer term conse-
quences of such closings could seriously limit the health care provided to hun-
dreds of thousands of our citizens.
In my judgment, no lasting solution is possible without sacrifice and fun-
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tice victims of traditional personal injury compensation and protec-
tion.2 The enactment of MICRA arose in the face of claims made by
medical malpractice insurers to the effect that they could no longer
provide health care professionals with low cost malpractice coverage.
Some insurers had withdrawn from the medical malpractice field,
while others raised the premiums they charged to health care provid-
ers to "skyrocketing" rates, 3 Without MICRA, it was feared many
doctors would be forced to practice without malpractice insurance,
practice "defensive medicine, ' 4 or terminate their practice in Cali-
fornia altogether. As a consequence, the availability of medical care
in some parts of the state would decline, and malpractice victims
treated by uninsured doctors would be left with unenforceable
judgments.
MICRA was enacted to address and remedy these malpractice in-
surance problems from several directions. Primarily, it was designed
to reduce the costs underlying high medical malpractice insurance
premiums. 5 The Act generally decreases the amount medical mal-
practice victims may recover for non-economic damages, "theoreti-
cally compelling a reduction in insurance premiums."' This theory
damental reform. It is critical that the Legislature enact laws which will
change the relationship between the people and the medical profession,
the legal profession and the insurance industry, and thereby reduce the
costs which underlie these high insurance premiums.
Proclamation by the Governor, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. 3947.
2. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985) (special limit on non-
economic damages); id. § 3333.1 (abrogation of collateral source rule); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 667.7 (West Supp. 1985) (exception to general rule requiring immediate lump
sum payment of a judgment); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985)
(special restrictions on attorney's fees).
3. Preamble to MICRA, ch. 2, § 12.5, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. 4007. The
Preamble states in part:
The Legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in
the State of California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs
and resulting in a potential breakdown of the health delivery system, severe
hardships for the medically indigent, a denial of access for the economically
marginal, and depletion of physicians such as to substantially worsen the qual-
ity of health care available to citizens of this state.
4. In a 1973 study by the Commission on Medical Malpractice of the United
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "defensive medicine" was defined
as: "the alteration of modes of medical practice, induced by the threat of liability, for the
principal purposes of forestalling the possibility of lawsuits by patients as well as provid-
ing a good legal defense in the event such lawsuits are instituted." U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, Pub. No. 73-88, THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
There is no clear consensus defining "defensive medicine." What might appear to be
defensive medical practice to one clinician may, to another, be quality medical care.
Trancredi & Barondess, The Problem of Defensive Medicine, 200 SCIENCE 879 (1978).
For example, one report concluded that, while increased electronic fetal monitoring and
caesarian sections probably were caused by the increasing number of suits surrounding
fetal injuries, those procedures did increase the survival of newborn babies. Id. at 882.
5. Preamble to MICRA, ch. 2, § 12.5, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. 4007.
6. Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation: Torts, 7 PAC. L.J. 544, 545
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assumes a high correlation between the cost of insurance premiums
and the dollar value of claims paid out to malpractice victims. How-
ever, this assumption is questionable.7
It is estimated that only twenty-five cents of every premium dollar
goes to compensate injured malpractice victims." As much as forty-
five cents covers the retention costs of the insurer; these include the
cost of selling, servicing and underwriting policies, and paying taxes
and overhead expenses. Approximately twenty-nine cents of every
premium dollar pays defense costs. Moreover, one medical malprac-
tice insurance company president has concluded that due to the large
return on investments, even with loss payments of ninety-eight per-
cent of premium, company investments will produce a profit equal to
five percent of premiums collected.9 In light of the weak correlation
between premium costs and damage awards, placing limits on the
medical malpractice victim's amount of recovery will have a negligi-
ble impact on premiums. 10
Four cases have recently come before the California Supreme
Court challenging several of the provisions of MICRA. 1 In all four
cases, the court has upheld the constitutionality of the challenged
provisions. Although the court has not strongly embraced the ration-
ale justifying the contested provisions, 2 it has, nonetheless, deferred
to the legislature's decision to place the burden of reducing medical
malpractice insurance rates on the victims of medical negligence.
(1976) (emphasis in original).
7. An Overview of Medical Malpractice: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1975) ("[iut is frequently
claimed that medical malpractice insurance is the most inefficient form of insurance in
terms of getting dollars to injured patients"); HEW REPORT, supra note 4,*at 100. ("[i]t
is estimated that a lower portion of the premium dollar is paid to medical malpractice
claimants than to claimants under any other form of casualty insurance").
8. An Overview of Medical Malpractice: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 7, at 20.
9. Id. at 21.
10. See Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal
Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 840-41 (1979).
11. Three of the four recent test cases, American Bank & Trust Co. v. Commu-
nity Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984); Roa v. Lodi Medi-
cal Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985); and Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985),
appeal denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3250 (1985), were decided by a slim four to three majority.
The fourth, Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984),
was decided by a vote of five to two.
12. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 163-64, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387. ("[o]ur
recent decisions do not reflect our support for the challenged provisions of MICRA as a
matter of policy, but simply our conclusion that under established constitutional princi-
ples the Legislature had the authority to adopt such measures").
The Challenged Provisions
Section 667.7 of the- California Civil Procedure Code13 requires
that payments of judgments for future damages in excess of $50,000
13. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West Supp. 1985). This code section reads as
follows:
(a) In any action for injury or damages against a provider of health care ser-
vices, a superior court shall, at the request of either party, enter a judgment
ordering that money damages or its equivalent for future damages of the judg-
ment creditor be paid in whole or in part by periodic payments rather than by
a lump-sum payment if the award equals or exceeds fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) in future damages. In entering a judgment ordering the payment of
future damages by periodic payments, the court shall make a specific finding as
to the dollar amount of periodic payments which will compensate the judgment
creditor for such future damages. As a condition to authorizing periodic pay-
ments of future damages, the court shall require the judgment debtor who is
not adequately insured to post security adequate to assure full payment of such
damages awarded by the judgment. Upon termination of periodic payments of
future damages, the court shall order the return of this security, or so much as
remains, to the judgment debtor.
(b) (1) The judgment ordering the payment of future damages by periodic
payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the dollar
amount of the payments, the interval between payments, and the number of
payments or the period of time over which payments shall be made. Such pay-
ments shall only be subject to modification in the event of the death of the
judgment creditor.
(2) In the event that the court finds that the judgment debtor has exhibited a
continuing pattern of failing to make the payments, as specified in paragraph
(I), the court shall find the judgment debtor in contempt of court and, in addi-
tion to the required periodic payments, shall order the judgment debtor to pay
the judgment creditor all damages caused by the failure to make such periodic
payments, including court costs and attorney's fees.
(c) However, money damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall not
be reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment
creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment creditor owed a
duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his death. In such
cases the court which rendered the original judgment, may, upon petition of
any party in interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the unpaid
future damages in accordance with this subdivision.
(d) Following the occurrence or expiration of all obligations specified in the
periodic payment judgment, any obligations of the judgment debtor to make
further payments shall cease and any security given, pursuant to subdivision
(a) shall revert to the judgment debtor.
(e) As used in this section:
(1) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, care
or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and
suffering of the judgment creditor.
(2) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money or delivery of other
property to the judgment creditor at regular intervals.
(3) "Health care provider" means any person licensed or certified pursuant
to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) of the Business and Professions
Code, or licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiroprac-
tic Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Sec-
tion 1440) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code; and any clinic, health
dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing
with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code. "Health care provider"
includes the legal representatives of a health care provider.
(4) "Professional negligence" means a negligent act or omission to act by a
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be made periodically rather than in one lump sum. This raises the
constitutional issues of equal protection and right to a jury trial.
Section 3333.1(a) of the California Civil Code14 alters the collat-
eral source rule' 5 by permitting a medical malpractice defendant to
introduce evidence of collateral source benefits received by or paya-
health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or
omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, pro-
vided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider
is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing
agency or licensed hospital.
(f) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to authorize the
entry of judgments in malpractice actions against health care providers which
provide for the payment of future damages through periodic payments rather
than lump-sum payments. By authorizing periodic payment judgments, it is the
further intent of the Legislature that the courts will utilize such judgments to
provide compensation sufficient to meet the needs of an injured plaintiff and
those persons who are dependent on the plaintiff for whatever period is neces-
sary while eliminating the potential windfall from a lump-sum recovery which
was intended to provide for the care of an injured plaintiff over an extended
period who then dies shortly after the judgment is paid, leaving the balance of
the judgment award to persons and purposes for which it was not intended. It
is also the intent of the Legislature that all elements of the periodic payment
program be specified with certainty in the judgment ordering such payments
and that the judgment not be subject to modification at some future time
which might alter the specifications of the original judgment.
14. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985). This section, in pertinent part,
reads as follows:
(a) In the event the defendant so elects, in an action for personal injury
against a health care provider based upon professional negligence, he may in-
troduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result
of the personal injury pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, any
state or federal income disability or worker's compensation act, any health,
sickness or income-disability insurance, accident insurance that provides health
benefits or income-disability coverage, and any contract or agreement of any
group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reim-
burse the cost of medical, hospital, dental, or other health care services. Where
the defendant elects to introduce such evidence, the plaintiff may introduce
evidence of any amount which the plaintiff has paid or contributed to secure
his right to any insurance benefits concerning which the defendant has intro-
duced evidence.
(b) No source of collateral benefits introduced pursuant to subdivision (a)
shall recover any amount against the plaintiff nor shall it be subrogated to the
rights of the plaintiff against a defendant.
15. The collateral source rule bars the deduction of collateral compensation, such
as insurance benefits or workers' compensation benefits, from a tort victim's damage
award. The rule prohibits evidence of collateral coverage from being introduced at trial
and prevents tortfeasors and their insurers from benefiting from the collateral source
funds which "are usually created through the prudence and foresight of persons other
than the tortfeasor, frequently including the injured person himself." Gypsum Carrier,
Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1962). See Hrnjak, v. Graymar,
Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 725, 484 P.2d 599, 94 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). See generally Schwartz,
The Collateral-Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REv. 348, 354 (1961).
ble to the plaintiff. Section 3333.1(b) of the Civil Code prevents a
"collateral source" from obtaining reimbursement from the defen-
dant's insurer. As applied, these sections benefit both negligent
tortfeasors and their insurers where a victim had the foresight to
obtain insurance. It shifts liability for the defendant's negligence
onto the innocent plaintiff and the plaintiff's collateral source in-
surer. This can only drive up victims' insurance rates.
Section 6146 of the California Business and Professions Code16
establishes a sliding scale which places incremental limits on the
amount of contingent fees a plaintiff's attorney may obtain in a med-
ical malpractice action. These limits were intended to protect the
victim's recovery. In practice, however, they undermine the ability of
medical malpractice plaintiffs to contract for the best legal represen-
tation possible, thereby tending to restrict victims' access to the
courts.
17
Finally, section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code16 limits non-
16. CAL, Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985) reads in relevant part as
follows:
(a) An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee for repre-
senting any person seeking damages in connection with an action for injury or
damage against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged profes-
sional negligence in excess of the following limits:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)
recovered.
(4) Ten percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds two hundred
thousand dollars ($200,000).
Such limitations shall apply regardless of whether the recovery is by settle-
ment, arbitration, or judgment, or whether the person for whom the recovery is
made is a responsible adult, an infant, or a person of unsound mind.
(b) If periodic payments are awarded to the plaintiff pursuant to Section
667.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court shall place a total value on
these payments based upon the projected life expectancy of the plaintiff and
include this amount in computing the total award from which attorney's fees
are calculated under this section.
(d) For purposes of this section:
(I) "Recovered" means the net sum recovered after deducting any disburse-
ments or costs incurred in connection with prosecution or settlement of the
claim. Costs of medical care incurred by the plaintiff and the attorney's office-
overhead costs or charges shall not be deductible disbursements or costs for
such purpose.
17. See Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 937, 695 P.2d at 175, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting) ("the right of petition is protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments to the
. Constitution. It encompasses the right of access to the courts . . . . Here, in the
judicial context, the expenditure of money for attorney fees is no less essential to the
exercise of First Amendment rights").
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985) reads in part as follows:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on profes-
sional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic
losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
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economic damages (for example, pain and suffering) in medical mal-
practice actions to $250,000. Section 3333.2 divests severely injured
medical negligence victims of their right to full compensation while
protecting the economic interests of health care providers and their
insurers.
In light of the narrow margins by which the cases challenging the
MICRA provisions were decided, and the decisions of other states
which have invalidated similar legislation, the constitutionality of
MICRA is tenuous. This should be of serious concern to the
legislature.' 9
Legislative action concerning MICRA is imperative. This Com-
ment examines the deleterious effects of MICRA's tort reform provi-
sions and provides recommendations for modifying the Act to avoid
the harsh inequities affecting medical malpractice victims under the
existing law.
THE DISCRIMINATIONS WROUGHT BY MICRA
According to a significant minority of the California Supreme
Court, MICRA violates the equal protection clauses of both the
United States20 and California Constitutions.2 1 MICRA discrimi-
nates against plaintiffs whose injuries are the result of professional
negligence in health care. Those victims injured in any other manner
may be compensated without the restrictions of MICRA.22 MICRA
disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed
two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
19. Recently, a California Senate bill, which would have repealed the four
MICRA provisions to which this Comment is addressed (see supra note 2) was killed. S.
520, Cal. Leg. 1985-86 Regular Sess.
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I ("[nor shall any State] deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
22. The classifications established by MICRA raise the issue of whether the tort
reform provisions can withstand a constitutional attack based on the equal protection
doctrine. The resolution of the equal protection issue requires a determination of the
proper standard of review to be applied by the courts.
Traditionally, equal protection analysis has employed two standards of review: strict
scrutiny and minimal scrutiny (the "two-tier" approach). Strict scrutiny requires that the
challenged legislation be necessary to the promotion of a compelling state interest. The
less stringent standard-minimal scrutiny-merely requires that the provisions of a chal-
lenged statute bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. This level of
scrutiny is characterized by extreme deference to the legislative branch.
The California Supreme Court, in the cases challenging the constitutionality of
MICRA, has utilized the rational relationship test, i.e., minimal scrutiny, in consistently
upholding the constitutionality of the provisions. Justice Mosk, in his dissenting opinion
in Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 179, 695 P.2d at 694, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 397, advocates an interme-
further discriminates within the class of medical malpractice victims,
affecting most severely those plaintiffs most seriously injured.
MICRA also creates two classes of defendants: 1) health care prov-
iders defending against actions for professional negligence; and 2)
defendants, whether or not health care providers, defending against
actions for personal injuries sustained outside the medical malprac-
tice context. The former class enjoys immunity from liability for
non-economic damages which exceed $250,000. The latter is subject
to unlimited liability.
Consider this illustration: A patient visits a physician for a routine
examination. While on the examining table, the patient is given an
injection which makes him dizzy. Left unattended, the patient falls
off the examining table, fracturing a cervical vertebrae resulting in
permanent quadriplegia. The patient is driven by ambulance to a
nearby hospital. The physician drives to the hospital; the patient's
spouse is enroute to the same hospital. The physician, while walking
across the street to the hospital, is struck by a vehicle. This vehicle is
driven by the patient's spouse. The collision causes a fracture of one
of the doctor's cervical vertebrae causing permanent quadriplegia.
Under section 3333.2, the quadriplegic patient, suing the physician,
cannot recover more than $250,000 in non-economic damages, while
the quadriplegic physician, suing the patient's spouse for personal
injuries, may recover for non-economic loss without limitation.23
Young victims are discriminated against as well. For example, as-
sume two persons are victims of medical malpractice: a seventy-five-
year-old man whose leg was mistakenly amputated, and a six-year-
old child who suffered the same injury. Assume further, the senior
citizen recovers a judgment of $250,000 for non-economic damages.
In light of the remaining years the child will suffer, it seems reasona-
ble to expect the child to recover an amount significantly greater
than the senior citizen. The senior is fairly compensated, while the
child is permitted to recover only part of his non-economic award,
under section 3333.2.24
Section 6146 of the Business and Professions Code25 places incre-
mental limits on attorney's fees in medical malpractice actions. Con-
sequently, plaintiffs' right to contract is severely curtailed. Addition-
ally, the method of paying damages awarded by the trier of fact in a
medical malpractice action is now controlled by the court, unlike any
diate standard of equal protection review. See Note, supra note 10, at 857-64. See also
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 657-97 (9th ed. 1975).
23. Respondent and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief at 70, Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
24. Id. at 69.
25. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985).
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other tort action. Section 667.7 of the Civil Procedure Code28 per-
mits the court to order periodic payment of future damages exceed-
ing $50,000, in lieu of the traditional lump sum payment. Similarly,
unlike any other tort action, evidence of collateral benefits is admis-
sible under section 3333.1 of the Civil Code. In an attempt to shift
the costs of negligence from the physician to the victim or victim's
insurer, this rule of evidence can only be expected to decrease the
amount of damages awarded by the trier of fact.
"Skyrocketing malpractice premium costs" motivated the enact-
ment of MICRA by the California legislature.28 Such concerns,
however, do not justify the immunity conferred upon health care
providers at the expense of victims who are less able to absorb the
risk.
There is no logically supportable reason why the most severely injured mal-
practice victims should be singled out to pay for special relief to medical
tortfeasors and their insurers. The idea of preserving insurance by imposing
huge sacrifices on a few victims is logically perverse. Insurance is a device
for spreading risks and costs among large numbers of people so that no one
person is crushed by misfortune [citations omitted]. In a strange reversal of
this principle [MICRA] concentrates the costs of the worst injuries on a
few individuals.
29
MICRA-type Legislation Outside California
Numerous states have held their medical malpractice legislation
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. For example, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court struck down a $500,000 limit on total dam-
ages,30 finding the limitation violated the equal protection provisions
of the Illinois Constitution.31
In New Hampshire, the state supreme court invalidated a medical
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West Supp. 1985).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985).
28. Preamble to MICRA, ch. 2, § 12.5, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. 4007.
29. Fein, 39 Cal. 3d at 173, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). Some of the tort reform provisions of MICRA, such as § 3333.1(a) and (b)
which abolishes the collateral source rule and limits the plaintiff's insurer's subrogation
rights, actually impose burdens on the plaintiff's insurance company rather than the
plaintiff. However, these provisions can be expected to increase plaintiff's liability insur-
ance costs. Other MICRA provisions, such as § 667.7 which requires that the plaintiff's
damage awards be paid in periodic installments rather than in one lump sum, adversely
affect the plaintiff directly.
30. Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976).
31. ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 13. Although the limit imposed by California applies
only to non-economic damages, where a California plaintiffs damages are mostly non-
economic, the limit may produce greater hardship than the Illinois limit.
malpractice act containing provisions almost identical to all four of
the MICRA provisions upheld by the California Supreme Court. 2
The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated: "It is simply unfair and
unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical care
industry solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and
therefore most in need of compensation." 33
The Florida Supreme Court invalidated several statutory provi-
sions, similar to those of California, reasoning "it is impossible that
singling out the most seriously injured malpractice victims (rather
than imposing the same burden equally upon all medical malpractice
victims) bears any reasonable relationship to the announced purpose
of alleviating the 'medical malpractice insurance crisis.'-84
The Ohio Medical Malpractice Act,35 which, among other things,
limits "general" (non-economic) damages to $200,000, received con-
stitutional review in two separate cases: Graley v. Satayatham36 and
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center.37 In each case, the court felt
the limit on general damages denied equal protection of the law, vio-
lating both the United States 8 and Ohio Constitutions.39 This
$200,000 provision is not markedly different than the $250,000 limit
of MICRA. In Graley, the court also invalidated a statutory provi-
sion mandating collateral benefits be stated in medical malpractice
complaints, finding this requirement unconstitutionally discriminated
against medical malpractice victims.
40
The North Dakota Supreme Court struck down the Medical Mal-
practice Act of its state;41 its provisions included a $300,000 limit on
total damages, a collateral source disclosure rule similar to
MICRA's, and a periodic payment of damages provision. The court
found these provisions were "arbitrary and unreasonable and dis-
criminatory ....
Other states recently invalidating similar provisions include Penn-
sylvania4 3 and Texas.44 The Texas decision, however, is presently
32. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
33. Id. at 937, 424 A.2d at 837.
34. Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022, 1027 (Fla.
1983).
35. OHno REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.27, 2307.42, 2307.43, 2711.21, 2743.02
(Page 1983).
36. 74 Ohio St. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976).
37. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 170, 355 N.E.2d 903, 910 (1976) ("[t]his court rejects
the societal ... argument that some must give up their rights to damages so that
all can achieve cheaper medical care").
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 2.
40. 74 Ohio St. 2d at 316, 343 N.E.2d at 832.
41. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.40.1-01-26.40.1-18 (1978).
42. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 137 (N.D. 1978).
43. Heller v. Frankston, 76 Pa. Commw. 294, 464 A.2d 581 (1983).
44. Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1984).
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under review by the Texas Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme
Court questioned the constitutionality of several provisions of medi-
cal malpractice legislation in Idaho, but ultimately declined to inval-
idate them without more factual data. 5
MICRA IS NOT RATIONALLY RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE STATE
INTEREST
The California Supreme Court has deferred to the wisdom of the
legislature and found the tort reform provisions of MICRA to be
rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in lowering medi-
cal malpractice insurance premiums. However, considering the nar-
row margins by which the provisions of the Act have been upheld in
California, and the decisions of sister states that have found almost
identical legislation unconstitutional, it becomes clear that the con-
stitutionality of MICRA is at least debatable.
The California legislature must be concerned about passing un-
constitutional laws. The handwriting on the wall requires another
close look at the statute with a view towards assessing its methods in
achieving the interests of the state. 6
There is No Legitimate State Interest Supporting MICRA
In the mid-1970's, physicians, other health care providers, and in-
stitutions nationwide campaigned for legislation which would bring
down the cost of medical malpractice premiums. Insurance carriers
justified their high premiums by pointing to the large increases in
both the number and dollar amounts of settlements and verdicts in
medical malpractice lawsuits.4 Thus, the major goal of the health
care industry was to limit the impact of successful suits on medical
profession defendants and their insurers.48 This campaign for reform
was extremely successful. Every state in the nation, with the excep-
45. Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
46. The California legislature has, in some instances, invalidated or revised dis-
criminatory legislation soon after the California Supreme Court upheld the statute in
question as constitutional. For example, one year after the language of the California
Civil Procedure Code, precluding dependent stepchildren from maintaining a wrongful
death action, CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1973), withstood challenge in Steed v.
Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 114, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1974), the Califor-
nia legislature amended the statute to include dependent stepchildren within the class of
persons who may maintain an action for wrongful death.
47. A.M.A. SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE,
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80S, Report 2, at 13 (1984) [hereinafter cited as PRO-
FESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80S].
48. Id.
tion of West Virginia, has enacted some type of reform.49 However,
the reasons motivating MICRA are without empirical support. In
enacting MICRA, the legislature failed to consider evidence which
showed that a limit on non-economic medical malpractice damages
might not result in appreciable savings to the insurance companies. 50
Moreover, losses experienced by the medical malpractice insurance
companies in the mid-1970's, in many instances, had little if any-
thing to do with malpractice claims.
The insurance industry losses which led to dramatic premium in-
creases were, in many cases, caused by large stock market invest-
ment losses, not by large non-economic damage awards. Malpractice
insurance companies lost approximately $193 million in the stock
market in 1974.51 One major malpractice insurance company in Cal-
ifornia began underwriting malpractice coverage in 1973. By 1975,
that insurer had collected approximately fifteen million dollars in
premiums and had paid out only $250,000. This same company lost
over $140 million in the stock market in 1974 and, thereafter, raised
insurance premiums over 300%.52 Another large commercial carrier
of medical malpractice insurance lost twenty-one million dollars on
its investments in 1974. In addition, it saw the paper value of its
bond and stock portfolio decrease by almost ninety million dollars
that same year.53 Now, in 1986, when interest rates are again low,
thus driving down investment income, it is not surprising to hear re-
newed concern for the "malpractice crisis" from the health care in-
surance industry.
According to some studies, the medical malpractice insurance in-
dustry was not experiencing financial difficulty at all, despite indus-
try claims that high malpractice awards were forcing them out of
business. According to one study, during the "crisis" period of 1970
through 1976, total malpractice insurance expenses nationwide (in-
cluding payments, administrative costs and associated expenses)
reached just over $3.6 billion. This figure corresponds to an industry
income of $4.3 billion. Assuming that these commercial companies
were responsible for ninety percent of the insurance volume, industry
profits were well over one billion dollars for that seven year period.5
49. Id.
50. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 172, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). ("in the years prior to the enactment of MICRA, no more than 14 medical
malpractice plaintiffs in any year received compensation totaling over $250,000 for eco-
nomic and non-economic damages combined").
51. Charbonneau, Medical Malpractice Crisis: Fact or Fiction?, 3 ORANGE
COUNTY B.J. 139, 141 (1976).
52. Id.
53. Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "'Crisis" in Perspective, 1976 INs.
L.J. 90, 96 (citing N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 49, col. 1).
54. J. GUNTHER, THE MALPRACTITIONERS 188 (1978).
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Another study, using statistics from the State Board of Medical Ex-
aminers and the State Auditor General, reveals that the total
amount of claims paid in settlements and judgments on malpractice
cases in California in 1974 was $33.7 million.55 This compares
poorly to the $120 million in medical malpractice premiums col-
lected by the insurance industry during that same year.56
Moreover, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America conducted
their own study, finding that between 1978 and 1983 the medical
malpractice insurance industry earned approximately $300 million
more on the investment of premiums than it paid out to victims.57
Considering that the insurance companies earned $7.34 billion in
premiums over that period, 58 it becomes evident that malpractice in-
surers are doing much better than they have lead the public, or the
doctors they insure, to believe.
Consequently it is highly questionable whether a "health care cri-
sis" was responsible for the enactment of MICRA and whether such
a crisis exists today. Some insurance companies may have exper-
ienced severe stock market losses. However, this stock market crisis
is not a legitimate state interest which will support discriminatory
legislation. In cases challenging MICRA-type statutes, several state
supreme courts have expressed doubt concerning the reality of the
medical malpractice "crisis." 59 Even the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) admitted that by 1978 the medical liability insurance
availability crisis appeared to have abated.
60
Interestingly, in 1979, Travelers Insurance Company, which car-
ried all the commercial medical malpractice insurance in Southern
California, was sued by 5500 doctors in Los Angeles county for
overcharging on medical malpractice insurance premiums. The case
settled prior to trial for approximately fifty million dollars.61 Where
did Travelers get the money to settle this suit if it is experiencing a
55. Charbonneau, supra note 51, at 140.
56. Id.
57. PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEP'T, ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMi,, INV. INCOME
ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1985).
58. A.M. Best's Casualty Loss Reserve Development (1984).
59. See Jones, 97 Idaho at 872, 555 P.2d at 412 ("li]t is argued that the Act is a
necessary legislative response to a 'crisis in medical malpractice insurance' in Idaho, but
the record does not demonstrate any such 'crisis' "). See also Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at
136 (in which the North Dakota Supreme Court claimed that no medical malpractice
crisis existed); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 93 (R.I. 1983) ("[a] plethora of facts
exists to substantiate the trial justice's finding that no malpractice crisis existed in
1981").
60. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80S, supra note 47, Report 1, at 6.
61. L.A. Times, Feb. 6, 1981, at 3, col. 4.
financial crisis?6 2
According to the health care profession, the "new" crisis is not
one of availability of insurance but rather one of affordability. The
AMA reports that between 1975 and 1983, medical liability premi-
ums increased by more than eighty percent.13 However, one survey
shows that the lowest rate hikes in the nation have occurred in Cali-
fornia.14 In 1984, the Saint Paul Insurance Company, the largest
insurer of medical liability insurance, charged a premium of between
$7014 and $8536 for the high risk category of obstetrician/gynecolo-
gist in California. 5 This premium would cover the physician for one
million dollars/three million dollars.6 ' The average gross salary for
physicians, nationwide, is over $230,000.7 A $9000 premium repre-
sents less than five percent of this salary.
The average doctor pays 2.9% of his gross income on malpractice
premiums.68 Even the average neurosurgeon spends only 5.8% on
medical malpractice insurance premiums, assuming an annual in-
come of only $200,000.69 Fifty-seven percent of doctors spend less
than $5000 per year on malpractice premiums, while only twelve
percent spend over $15,000.70 As Richard Shandell, a New York
trial lawyer observed recently: "A New York City doctor, who pays
the highest [malpractice] premiums in the country, pays a smaller
percentage of his gross income on liability insurance than does a
New York cab driver.
' 71
These statistics bring into question the need for MICRA-type leg-
islation. Assuming, arguendo, medical liability premium costs are
too high, as the Ohio Supreme Court has observed:
There obviously is no "compelling governmental interest" [in enacting
62. Id. at 28, col. 1. William Shernoff, the attorney representing the physicians in
the lawsuit, called the malpractice furor a "phony crisis" and stated: "It's very simple.
They made excessive profits and now they have to disgorge them."
63. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, supra note 47, Report 1, at 8.
64. Id. at 12. This survey was conducted by the American Medical Assurance
Company.
65. Insurance Rates Listing from Daugard Insurance Agency, Inc., Tarzana, Cal-
ifornia (1984).
66. Id. This coverage allows three one-million dollar claims per year.
67. The average net salary is $129,500. Owens, Doctors' Earnings: The Year of
the Big Surprise, MEDICAL EcONOMICS, Sept. 9, 1985, at 195, 203.
68. Kirchner, Is Your Practice Begging For More Money?, MEDICAL ECONOM-
Ics, Nov. 12, 1984, at 214, 230. In addition, the doctor's malpractice insurance premiums
can be deducted as a business expense from his or her income tax. This amount is close
to the 2.3% spent on "professional car upkeep," and well over the 1.2% spent on continu-
ing education. Id.
69. Id. at 230. The percentage would be lower for most neurosurgeons who typi-
cally make more than $200,000 per year.
70. Id. at 229.
71. Letter from R. Shandell to the Editor of the Wall Street Journal (Oct. 6,
1983) (On file with the Public Affairs Dep't, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am., Washington,
D.C.).
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MICRA-type legislation] unless it be argued that any segment of the public
in financial distress be at least partly relieved of financial accountability for
its negligence . . . . It is not the business of government to manipulate the
law so as to provide succor to one class, the medical, by depriving another,
the malpractice patients, of the equal protection mandated by the
constitution.
72
MICRA Promotes Litigation Targeting Defendants Not
Immunized
The tort reform provisions of MICRA can be expected to decrease
the litigation costs of health care providers in two ways. Due to the
$250,000 limit placed on plaintiffs' potential recovery for non-eco-
nomic damages, and limits on their ability to contract for quality
legal representation, MICRA will deter the redress of legitimate
grievances through litigation. Consequently, victims of malpractice
may go either uncompensated or undercompensated.
On the other hand, defendants targeted in litigation can be ex-
pected to shift from health care providers to manufacturers of health
care products, drugs, and equipment. For example, section 6146 of
the California Business and Professions Code, limiting plaintiffs' at-
torney's contingency fees, applies only to actions against "health
care providers."73 Plaintiffs' attorneys can naturally be expected to
name the manufacturers of the surgical instruments, drugs, or anes-
thetics used in a negligent medical procedure in medical malpractice
lawsuits.74 The $250,000 limit on non-economic damages under sec-
72. Graley, 74 Ohio St. 2d at 321, 343 N.E.2d at 837.
73. "Health care provider," as defined in MICRA, includes any person licensed
or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with § 500) of the Business and Profes-
sions Code, or licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to
Chapter 2.5 (commencing with § 1440) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code; and
any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 (com-
mencing with § 1200) of the Health and Safety Code. "Health care provider" includes
the legal representatives of a health care provider. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
6146 (West Supp. 1985).
74. Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974),
provides an example of the extension of liability in malpractice cases, in which suit is
brought against potential litigants other than the negligent health care provider(s). In
Niles, suit was brought for damages arising from injuries sustained in a fight on a school
playground. Liability was found on the part of the health care providers for medical
malpractice, and also on the part of the city for negligent supervision of the playground.
This phenomenon has occurred in other tort liability cases as well. In Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), the manufac-
turer of a high lift loader was sued and held liable for injuries sustained by the inexperi-
enced operator. Suit was not brought against the plaintiff's employer for negligent super-
vision, as the damage award would likely have been limited by the plaintiff's workers'
compensation. See also Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (wrongful death action against the manufacturer of a paydozer
tion 3333.2 of the Civil Code also motivates such creative pleading
which names defendants not protected by MICRA.
Actions against drug and medical equipment manufacturers can
only raise the overhead costs of health care providers by increasing
the price of medical products. This, in essence, defeats the purpose
of MICRA. The lower insurance costs to health care providers are
offset by increased costs for drugs and medical supplies and equip-
ment. Even if MICRA is successful in decreasing the overall costs to
health care providers through a decrease in defense litigation costs,
the severely injured malpractice victims-those most in need of com-
pensation-ultimately shoulder the burden of subsidizing insurance
costs for the medical profession.
MICRA and Traditional Negligence Liability
A central issue in the MICRA debate is the extent to which pub-
lic policy allows a tortfeasor or his insurer to avoid liability for the
consequences of his conduct. Section 1714(a) of the California Civil
Code states: "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his
willful acts, but also for any injury occasioned to another by his
want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or
person. '7 5 Justice Traynor, writing for the majority in Malloy v.
Fong, 7 stated that the policy behind section 1714 "admits of no ex-
ception based upon the objectives, however laudable, of the
tortfeasor." 7 This pro-plaintiff public policy declaration was pre-
served and re-emphasized in Brown v. Merlo.8
It is difficult to justify MICRA within the spirit of public policy
espoused in Malloy. The statute does not require that costs saved in
litigation expenses be passed on to health care providers in the form
of lower malpractice premiums. Insurance companies can internalize
the savings they realize as a result of MICRA and continue to
charge high premiums for medical malpractice coverage. A statutory
scheme which relies upon the altruism of insurance companies
should not dilute the traditional fault-based liability system by
granting broad immunity to one of the wealthiest segments of our
society.
In Li v. Yellow Cab,79 the California Supreme Court made it clear
that "in a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of
fault should govern the extent of liability . ."80 The Li court, in
which was driven in reverse into decedent).
75. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
76. 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
77. Id. at 366, 232 P.2d at 247.
78. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 867, 506 P.2d 212, 224, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 400 (1973).
79. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
80, Id. at 811, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
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eliminating contributory negligence, created "a system under which
liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused
it in direct proportion to their respective fault."81
MICRA undermines the fault-based liability policy proclaimed in
both Malloy and Li. By limiting potential damage awards, placing
limits on attorney's fees, and allowing the court to prescribe the
schedule of damage payments, MICRA has injected characteristics
of the no-fault workers' compensation regime into a fault-based lia-
bility system. By creating this hybrid, MICRA adopts the elements
of a no-fault system without the accompanying advantages of strict
liability. Incorporating the severe restrictions of MICRA into the
traditional fault-based civil litigation system creates a legal mis-
match in which the plaintiff is unfairly disadvantaged. This hybrid
system disguises medical malpractice dispute resolution under the il-
lusion of fair judicial determination.
Either a no-fault system should be fully instituted to resolve all
medical malpractice personal injury actions, imputing strict liability
to negligent health care providers, or medical malpractice actions
should return to unlimited liability whereby tortfeasors must fully
compensate victims for their wrongs as determined by the trier of
fact. In its present form, MICRA has no place in our civil litigation
system.
82
REVISION OF MICRA's TORT REFORM PROVISIONS
Section 3333.2 of the Civil Code
Section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code83 establishes a
$250,000 limit for non-economic damages in medical malpractice ac-
tions. This provision also denies medical negligence victims the right
to a jury trial by requiring the judge to decrease the jury's non-eco-
nomic damage award to a level not exceeding $250,000.84 In effect,
81. Id. at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
82. If the legislature believes that MICRA provides a reasonable framework for
tort dispute resolution, then no-fault regimes, such as workers' compensation, should be
brought back into the courts for hybridized judicial determination. Alternatively, medical
malpractice cases could be treated the same as workers' compensation cases. Either way,
the small class of seriously injured malpractice victims would then not be subjected to
the unique treatment afforded by the restrictions of MICRA.
83. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985).
84. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 16. ("[t]rial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be
secured to all ....") It is well established that this constitutional guarantee entitles the
parties in a personal injury action to a jury finding on the amount of damages. See
Langdon v. Superior Ct., 65 Cal. App. 41, 43-44, 223 P. 72, 73 (1923); Farrell v. City of
Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 351, 353-57, 178 P. 740, 741-42 (1919).
the statute takes away from the jury the right to make a finding of
fact that non-economic losses are greater than this cap.
Section 3333.2 of the Civil Code Discriminates Against
Manufacturing Defendants
Section 3333.2 discriminates against manufacturers who are in-
cluded as defendants in medical malpractice actions.8 5 Generally,
contributory wrongdoers, whether joint, concurrent, or successive
tortfeasors, are jointly and severally liable for all damages proxi-
mately caused by any defendant. 86 Suppose a health care provider
and a drug manufacturer were joined as defendants in an action
brought by a malpractice victim. The jury awards $750,000 in non-
economic damages jointly and severally against the two defendants
and the plaintiff collects the entire judgment against the drug manu-
facturer. If the drug manufacturer sought contribution against the
health care provider, it would not be able to recover the full pro rata
share of $375,000 due to the $250,000 ceiling imposed by section
3333.2 of the Civil Code. The drug manufacturer would sustain a
$125,000 loss.
87
There is no rational justification for imposing a greater burden on
the manufacturing defendant than on the health care provider. This
result undermines the public policy of California, which favors com-
parative negligence and indemnity among joint tortfeasors.88 The
manufacturing defendant, like the victim, is arbitrarily penalized by
the discrimination inherent in this provision.
Non-Economic Damages Should Not Be Limited By Statute
The limits placed by MICRA on the recovery of non-economic
damages apparently assumes such damages are less compelling than
other types of damages. This proposition is disputable. Chief Justice
Bird, in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,8 9 stated: "The burden
on medical malpractice victims is no less real by virtue of the fact
that it is 'non-economic' injury which goes uncompensated." 0 The
propriety of awarding non-economic damages is firmly embedded in
our common law jurisprudence and includes not only recovery for
physical pain and loss of enjoyment of life, but also recovery for
85. Respondent and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief at 78, Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
86. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(c) (West 1980).
87. This hypothetical presupposes that each defendant is found equally liable.
The California Civil Procedure Code provides for contribution among joint tortfeasors.
Id. §§ 875-880.
88. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d
899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
89. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985).
90. Id. at 171, 695 P.2d at 689, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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"fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, hu-
miliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or
ordeal." 9'
While $250,000 might, on first impression, appear to be a consid-
erable sum to award for non-economic damages, a report by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners shows that in 1978
infants accounted for twenty-five percent of all cases in which in-
demnity was paid for "permanent major injuries." 2 The same study
shows that infants accounted for thirty-two percent of all "grave in-
juries.193 Spread over an entire lifetime of suffering by these infants,
$250,000 shrinks to insignificance.
94
Although the concepts of "pain and suffering," loss of consortium,
and other similar non-economic damages are admittedly difficult to
valuate in monetary terms,95 they are not unquantifiable or undefina-
ble concepts.
For a child victim of medical negligence who has, for example,
become paralyzed, the compensation collected for a lifetime worth of
suffering comes from "non-economic damages." ' Similarly, a per-
son, whether child, adolescent, or adult, who has been severely disfig-
ured, is compensated by "non-economic damages" for the suffering
resulting from humiliation and embarrassment.97
Clearly "pain and suffering" is a reality for those who must en-
dure the symptoms. For poor plaintiffs, non-economic damages pro-
vide the principal source of compensation for reduced lifespan or loss
of physical capacity in instances where they are unable to prove sub-
stantial loss of future earnings or other economic damages.
Because it-is difficult for one to place a dollar value on non-eco-
nomic losses, that responsibility has traditionally been delegated to
the jury. In Hysell v. Iowa Public Service Co.,98 the court observed:
91. Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-93, 500 P.2d 880, 883,
103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1972).
92. "Permanent major injuries" is a category just below "grave injuries." PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80S, supra note 47, Report 1, at 8.
93. Id.
94. If the plaintiff invests the non-economic award at an interest rate of 10%, the
award would yield $25,000 per year. However, when considered with the other provisions
of MICRA, most notably § 667.7, the $25,000 non-economic award, paid periodically,
will not yield the interest that a lump sum payment would.
95. See Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511-12, 364 P.2d
337, 350, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 174 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
96. Koskoff, The Nature of Pain and Suffering, 13 TRIAL 21, 23 (1977).
97. Hampton, Anxiety Neurosis Following Trauma, 30 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 1, 2 (1973).
98. 559 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1977).
"There is no market in pain and suffering-any monetary value is
necessarily inexact, and the trier of fact must be afforded wide dis-
cretion in determining what is fair compensation." 99 Section 3333.2
has preempted a role most appropriately left to the jury.
A likely by-product of section 3333.2 is the characterization of
non-economic damages as enacting special damages. For example,
where medical malpractice resulting in disfigurement gives rise to a
maximum non-economic award of only $250,000, recovery of costs
for psychotherapy and psychoanalysis in treating the mental effects
of the disfigurement is unlimited. Such costs can be expected to be
claimed with increasing frequency and creativity as a result of the
arbitrary limit placed on claims for non-economic damages.
Suggested Revisions
Non-economic damages are as real and worthy of compensation as
any other form of damages. Our common law tradition has always
recognized the right of a person to be made whole for injuries by the
responsible tortfeasor or tortfeasors.10 Because the limitation placed
by MICRA on the recovery of non-economic damages is only weakly
related to the goal of lowering malpractice premiums,"' an arbitrary
limit on non-economic damages is not justified. No rational basis ex-
ists for singling out the most severely injured victims of medical neg-
ligence to subsidize health care providers and their insurers in re-
duced non-economic damages. It is difficult to propose revisions,
within the framework of damage limitations, which preserve any de-
gree of equity for the medical malpractice plaintiff.
However, a patient compensation fund would help ensure that in-
jured plaintiffs are fully compensated for their injuries, while lower-
ing the cost burden on the medical profession. Such a fund could be
operated by the state and used to pay the remainder of any settle-
ment or judgment against a health care provider in excess of a statu-
torily defined amount. The patient compensation fund might be
funded through a surcharge on health care providers, medical insti-
tutions, insurance companies, health care consumers, or taxpayers in
general. This system would spread the risk of liability over a statuto-
rily specified group, prevent individual insurance companies from
suffering potentially lethal losses, and ensure that professional liabil-
ity insurance remains available and affordable. Patient compensation
funds have been upheld by the state supreme courts in Florida, Indi-
ana, Louisiana, and Nebraska. 02
99. Id. at 472.
100. Malloy, 37 Cal. 2d at 356, 232 P.2d at 241.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
102. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, supra note 47, Report 1, at 12-13.
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The California legislature might enact a pro rata reduction for all
non-economic damages.1 03 For example, if the legislature provided
for a five to fifteen percent reduction on all non-economic damage
awards, it would reduce the financial burden on medical malpractice
insurers, while at the same time reducing the present burden on
those plaintiffs with the most severe injuries.0
Another possible revision would be to simply raise the limit on
non-economic damages to, for instance, one million dollars. Such a
reform minimizes the inequities and discriminations inherent in the
original provision by adversely affecting fewer severely injured mal-
practice victims. Of course, the small group of individuals with non-
economic damage awards over this figure would remain under-
compensated.10 5
Section 6146 of the Business and Professions Code
Section 614616 undermines the concept of high quality legal rep-
resentation by prescribing fees much lower than those obtainable by
attorneys in other tort actions. This provision severely limits the abil-
ity of seriously injured plaintiffs to contract for quality legal repre-
sentation. By artificially depressing the victim's legal representation
fees in medical malpractice actions, while at the same time permit-
ting defendants to otherwise pay whatever the market will bear for
top quality legal services, medical malpractice plaintiffs are denied
full enjoyment of their constitutional rights of equal protection and
due process.
1 07
Section 6146 establishes a sliding scale of fee limits; the greater
the recovery, the lower the allowable percentage. This regime has
several effects. By imposing fee limits (ten percent of all awards over
$200,000), the plaintiff will have the most difficulty obtaining qual-
103. See Note, supra note 10, at 952.
104. This presupposes that juries would need to be kept in the dark concerning the
pro rata reduction of the non-economic award. As soon as one juror became aware of the
statutory reduction, that jury could be expected to increase the non-economic award by
the same percentage that the award is required to be decreased by the statute. This
suggested reform removes only one of the several types of discrimination inherent in
MICRA. It does not resolve the constitutional "jury trial" question.
105. The number of malpractice victims with non-economic damages exceeding
one million dollars would indeed be small. In 1978, only three out of every 1000 claims, a
total of 23 claims, represented a one million dollar plus award in economic and non-
economic damages combined. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, supra note 47, Re-
port I, at 6-8.
106. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985).
107. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
ity representation in those cases requiring a large recovery to fully
compensate the victim. These are the very cases which most deserve
and require quality legal representation. Because section 6146 per-
tains only to medical malpractice, these cases may become less at-
tractive to plaintiffs' attorneys, leaving the malpractice victim with a
smaller pool of attorneys to choose from.'"8 Conversely, defendants
can concentrate their legal resources on those cases with the highest
potential loss. Given that medical malpractice defendants are now
limited to paying $250,000 in non-economic damages, defendants
can focus on liability issues in those cases with large special damages
by assigning these cases to their best, most highly paid attorneys,
creating a legal mismatch which finds plaintiffs on the losing end.
Another likely effect of the decreasing sliding scale arrangement is
to reduce the amount of time and money available to plaintiffs' at-
torneys in obtaining a higher damage award. This exacerbates the
inherent conflict of interest between attorneys and their clients in
contingent fee arrangements. 0 9 Defendants' attorneys may be moti-
vated to include plaintiffs' attorney's fees, at rates higher than that
allowed by section 6146, as a part of settlement arrangements. This
may pursuade plaintiffs' attorneys to encourage earlier settlement at
lower recovery levels.
One study showed that 440 attorney hours are expended on the
average "zero recovery" malpractice case. 1 0 Under the sliding scale
provision, along with the other tort reform provisions of MICRA,
many attorneys can be expected to turn away medical malpractice
cases despite valid claims, where complex injuries will require expen-
sive expert testimony. Alternatively, plaintiffs' attorneys can be ex-
pected to seek compensation on an hourly rate basis; hourly fees are
not controlled by the statute. In this instance, the Act discriminates
against poor plaintiffs who cannot afford to retain legal representa-
tion at an hourly rate.
In a survey conducted by this writer of personal injury/medical
malpractice attorneys throughout California,"' ninety percent of
108. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated in Carson v. Maurer
The regulation of attorney's fees solely in the area of medical malpractice inev-
itably will make such cases less attractive to the plaintiff bar. Consequently,
[the statute] will at least somewhat deter the litigation of legitimate causes of
action, thus creating a potential impediment to injured individuals' access to
the courts and counsel.
120 N.H. at 939, 424 A.2d at 839.
109. A comparison may be drawn here to a progressive tax system wherein each
additional dollar earned is taxed to a greater degree, thus decreasing the work incentive.
See Note, supra note 10, at 944 n.696 ("[t]o some extent, [the disincentive on plaintiff's
attorney to pursue a higher recovery] must have been the goal of MICRA").
110. HEW REPORT, supra note 4, at 33. When handling a case on a contingency
fee basis, the attorney receives a "zero recovery" unless the suit is won.
11I. To better gauge the effect MICRA has had on practicing attorneys in Cali-
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those responding claimed that they are less likely to take a medical
malpractice case under MICRA. Interestingly, fifty-eight percent of
those surveyed said that, of the four tort reform provisions addressed
in this Comment, the sliding scale provision most discouraged them
from taking a medical malpractice case. Limiting contingency fees
tends to drive attorneys out of the medical malpractice market, in-
creasing the burden on malpractice victims who deserve high quality
legal representation.
Plaintiffs' ability to obtain competent legal representation is essen-
tial to the successful prosecution of a medical malpractice action.
The fee limits imposed by section 6146 may undermine the plaintiffs'
right to petition the government for redress of grievances, even
though a similar argument was recently rejected by the United
States Supreme Court within the limited context of Veterans Ad-
fornia, surveys were mailed to 127 personal injury/medical malpractice attorneys
throughout the state. A total of 40 were completed and returned, for a response ratio of
31%. The questions and results are as follows:
A. California Civil Code § 3333.1
B. California Civil Code § 3333.2
C. California Business & Professions Code § 6146
D. California Civil Procedure Code § 667.7
Question 1. Do you agree that MICRA, in some form, is needed in California?
Results: Yes-4, No-36
Question 2. Of the four MICRA provisions identified above, place the letter of the
provision which you find most discourages you from taking a medical malpractice case
next to each of the following types of malpractice situations:
Results: (More than one answer was given for each situation)
i. Wrongful death action: A-3, B-15, C-14, D-6
ii. Soft tissue injury: A-1 1, B-8, C-8, D-3
iii. Failure to diagnose: A-5, B-17, C-17, D-6
iv. Malpractice generally: A-8, B-19, C-18, D-10
Question 3. Given that California has enacted MICRA, are you a) MORE IN-
CLINED, b) LESS INCLINED, c) NEITHER to resolve a medical malpractice case by
settlement than if California had not enacted MICRA?
Results: MORE INCLINED-18, LESS INCLINED-0, NEITHER-19
Question 4. Given that California has enacted MICRA, are you a) MORE LIKELY,
b) LESS LIKELY, c) NEITHER to take a plaintiff's medical malpractice case than if
California had not enacted MICRA?
Results: MORE LIKELY-0, LESS LIKELY-35, NEITHER-4
Question 5. Do you tend to charge the maximum fee allowed under MICRA (Business
& Professions Code ]] 6146) in cases with small recoveries ($50,000 dollars)?
Results: Yes-34, No-6
Question 6. Would a provision in the statute allowing for higher fees in exceptionally
difficult cases make it more likely for you to take medical malpractice cases?
Results: Yes-3 I, No-7
Question 7. In your view what changes, if any, should be made to California's
MICRA?
Results: Several responses to this question have been incorporated, in some form, into
this Comment.
ministration benefit hearings. 112
In Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, a3 the majority compared MICRA
to workers' compensation, claiming that regulation of attorney's fees
in California is not unusual." 4 However, workers' compensation is
readily distinguishable from section 6146. Under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act," 5 injured parties do not have to prove negligence.
Also, attorneys are not likely to be discouraged from taking cases in
the workers' compensation field since the risks are relatively low and
"reasonable compensation" is statutorily provided.'-" In malpractice
actions, however, attorneys receive no compensation unless there is a
recovery in the case.
Non-limited Contingency Fees Screen Out Groundless Suits
A further justification offered for the sliding-scale fee arrange-
ment is the deterrence of frivolous suits." 7 However, bringing frivo-
lous medical malpractice suits is highly unlikely given the costs,
time, and effort required to win.""8 The risk of a zero recovery is
already quite high; sixty percent of medical malpractice cases which
go to trial are unsuccessful, resulting in no recovery." 9 In 1973, a
112. In Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985),
the Court overturned the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California which had issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring the
enforcement of a $10 fee limit on attorney's fees in cases in which veterans seek death
and disability benefits. The District Court, holding that the attorney's fee limitation in-
fringed on the plaintiff's right of petition, had stated, "[i]t is evident that the First
Amendment protects individual's rights to obtain the adequate legal representation nec-
essary to ensure their rights of petition, access to the courts, and association, just as it
protects organizations' rights to such representation." National Ass'n of Radiation Survi-
vors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1324-25 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
The Supreme Court, with Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statutory fee limitation on the grounds that: 1) invalidation of the fee
limitation would frustrate the Congressional goal of giving the veteran the entire benefits
award, without dividing it with an attorney, 105 S. Ct. at 3189-91; 2) invalidation would
complicate a process that Congress wished to be as informal and nonadversarial as possi-
ble, id. at 3191-92; and 3) "the process allows a claimant to make a meaningful presen-
tation" on behalf of his claim for disability benefits without the assistance of an attorney.
Id. at 3197.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Stevens stated that "[w]hat is at stake is the right
of an individual to consult an attorney of his choice . . . .In my opinion that right is
firmly protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and by the First
Amendment." Id. at 3214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 922, 695 P.2d 164, 166-67, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79-80 (1985).
114, Id. at 922, 695 P.2d at 166-67, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
115. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971).
116. Id. § 4903 (the statute provides for "a reasonable attorney's fee for legal
services pertaining to any claim for compensation ... ).
117. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 931, 695 P.2d at 170-71, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84.
118. Keene, California's Medical Malpractice Crisis, in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE
TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 29-30 (1976).
119. Reder, Contingent Fees in Litigation with Special Reference to Medical Mal-
practice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 218, 227 (1978).
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United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Com-
mission on Medical Malpractice found the contingency fee arrange-
ment operates as an effective screening device against groundless lia-
bility suits, since the lawyer who loses collects nothing.120 The
prospect of spending a great deal of time pursuing a suit that will
ultimately be lost caused medical liability attorneys to reject eighty-
five percent of all prospective plaintiffs.' 2' Arguably, limiting the at-
torney's contingency fee will further prevent the litigation of merito-
rious claims.
Some experts suggest that limiting an attorney's percentage of a
liability award only encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to seek even
larger awards.122 Indeed, the survey this writer conducted reveals
that the great majority (eighty-five percent) of attorneys involved
with medical malpractice cases tend to charge the maximum fee al-
lowed under section 6146 in cases with small recoveries. In such
cases, the statute may actually increase the attorney's contingency
fee by providing a floor (forty percent of the first $50,000 recovered)
as well as a ceiling on the contingency percentage rate.
Suggested Revisions
Generally, the goal of section 6146 of the Business and Professions
Code is to lower malpractice insurance premiums by reducing "over-
compensation" paid to plaintiffs' attorneys. 123 However, these fees
are not significantly greater than those of defendants' attorneys.124
There is no rational basis for restricting plaintiffs' fees while leaving
defendants' fees untouched. In fact, since defendants' fees are paid
directly out of insurance funds, limits on these fees would yield a far
greater potential reduction of premiums than equivalent limits on
plaintiffs' fees. Section 6146 should, therefore, be revised to place
limits on defendants' attorney's fees.
If limits are imposed on plaintiffs' attorney's fees, there are several
reforms that, if instituted, would help ease the burden on injured
120. HEW REPORT, supra note 4, at 33. In its survey, the Commission found that
plaintiffs' attorneys believed that medical liability cases were the most difficult of all
personal injury suits.
121. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, supra note 47, Report 2, at 18.
122. Id.
123. See Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 920, 695 P.2d at 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The
theory is that, because plaintiffs' attorneys will take a smaller percentage of a damage
award, there will be less of an incentive to continue work on a case and lower settlements
will be more likely, thus leading to lower malpractice insurance costs.
124. HEW REPORT, supra note 4, at 33.
malpractice victims. One method would reverse the statute's sliding
scale by providing the highest percentage rate to the highest recov-
eries. Attorneys would thus not be discouraged from taking on the
most difficult cases. This would make it easier for the most severely
injured malpractice victims to obtain quality legal representation.
125
Of course it could be argued that if the present fee schedule were
reversed, those plaintiffs with the lowest potential damage awards
would have a more difficult time contracting for legal counsel. This
argument has merit, given that the most difficult aspects of a mal-
practice case, proof of negligence and proximate causation, are pre-
sent regardless of the size of the damage award. Perhaps the better
method of limiting plaintiffs' attorney's contingency fees would be to
establish a fixed 33.3% contingency fee rate for all levels of recovery.
This limit is reasonable and is in keeping with most other tort cases.
It also eliminates higher contingency fees (those over this
percentage).
If plaintiffs' attorney's fees are to remain limited to present levels,
some method should be incorporated to provide higher fees in excep-
tionally difficult cases. This would, of course, present the problem of
determining which cases are the most difficult. The vast majority of
all malpractice cases are difficult to prosecute. Consequently, this
may not be a feasible revision. Significantly, eighty-two percent of
all attorneys surveyed by this writer said that a statutory provision
allowing for higher fees in exceptionally difficult cases would make it
more likely for them to take a medical malpractice case.
Section 667.7 of the Civil Procedure Code
By requiring periodic payments for future damages awards over
$50,000, the legislature hoped to alleviate the detrimental effect on
insurance companies of paying large, lump sum judgments. 6 How-
ever, section 667.7127 may bring great harm to medical malpractice
victims by denying them due compensation.
Section 667.7 Usurps the Traditional Role of the Jury
The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the California Constitu-
tion. 1 28 Section 667.7 deprives medical malpractice victims of this
right by failing to leave intact the determination of damages made
by the jury. While the jury makes the initial award, in cases involv-
125. Malpractice victims will be harder pressed than other tort victims to obtain
quality legal representation until all of the restrictive tort provisions of MICRA are ei-
ther revised or repealed.
126. See Note, supra note 10, at 966-68 (discussing the relationship between
§ 667.7 and the attainment of the goals of MICRA).
127. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West Supp. 1985).
128. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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ing future damages of $50,000 or more, the judge determines the
dollar amount and schedule of payments. This statute denies medical
malpractice plaintiffs the right to trial by jury concerning these fac-
tual issues. In her dissenting opinion in American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Community Hospital,29 Chief Justice Bird stated:
Under [section 667.7] the judge possesses the power to nullify the jury's
award of damages even though the award is entirely proper. A defendant
who fails to convince the jury enjoys a second chance before the judge. The
procedure violates the very essence of the right to trial by jury. 30
The power given to the court to alter a jury award may be devas-
tating to the plaintiff. Overestimating the victim's lifespan, as deter-
mined by the jury, may spread future damages over a period longer
than that which the injured victim will actually live. A significant
percentage of the jury award can, therefore, remain in the hands of
the defendant. A court error of only one year may deprive the plain-
tiff of twenty-five percent of the jury award. 131 The court may ulti-
mately deprive the plaintiff of this award when it is most needed or,
alternatively, might second guess the findings made by the jury on
the expected inflation rate. This could lead to a significant difference
in the size of the actual recovery.
If the victim dies before receiving full payment of the damage
award, the balance of the money that was awarded becomes a wind-
fall for the defendant's insurance company. Moreover, the defen-
dant's insurance company need not pay interest to the injured victim.
Any profit made from investments remains in their hands. By depriv-
ing the malpractice victim of access to the entire amount of the
judgment, the statute places upon that individual the entire risk that
unforeseen future contingencies, related to the injury, will render the
periodic payments inadequate to meet his or her needs.
Jury-designated damage awards are not restricted in any other
type of civil action. There is no rational reason why medical mal-
practice damage awards should be paid out differently in these cases
than in other actions. Alternatively, if periodic damage payments
must remain a part of medical malpractice awards, no-fault and at-
torney's fees provisions, such as those found in the workers' compen-
sation system, are necessary to make it rational.132
129. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
130. Id. at 390, 683 P.2d at 690, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 691 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Suggested Revisions
Any time a judge is permitted to tamper with the findings made
by the jury, the jury trial guarantee is abrogated to some degree.
Short of repeal, the solution might be found in making the periodic
payment provision discretionary on the part of the jury, rather than
mandatory on the court. This would be more in keeping with the
historical and constitutional function of the jury in determining
damages.
If the legislature intends the provision to remain mandatory, it
should be revised to guarantee the plaintiff at least fifty percent of
the entire damage award. This guaranteed percentage should be paid
in a lump sum to reduce the possibility of inadequate coverage of the
plaintiff's future needs arising from his or her injury.
Plaintiffs with the largest future damage awards are generally se-
verely injured, with future needs that are difficult to predict. To help
ensure that the unexpected contingency needs of these plaintiffs will
be provided for, periodic payments should be set at a $100,000 per
year minimum for awards exceeding $100,000 in future damages.
In the event the victim dies before complete payment has been
made, all outstanding periodic payments should revert to the victim's
heirs or dependents. This would eliminate defendant's insurer ob-
taining a windfall by retaining the funds which the jury has awarded
to the victim. Alternatively, if the legislature believes that these
funds should not go to the victim's estate, any profit the insurance
companies make from the plaintiff's early demise or from investment
income should be utilized to reduce malpractice insurance
premiums. 133
Section 3333.1(a) of the Civil Code
Section 3333.1(a) 134 distinguishes between medical malpractice
victims and all other tort victims by allowing the defendants in mal-
practice actions to introduce evidence of insurance or other compen-
sation obtained by the plaintiff, thus invalidating the collateral
source rule. The supporters of MICRA claim the provision elimi-
nates double recoveries,135 but this argument is not convincing. The
victim (or his family) has either paid the premiums for the "collat-
eral" insurance or has earned the payments as a part of benefits
which substitute for earned wages. Because tort victims must pay
133. While it is apparently assumed by the legislature that savings from periodic
payments and reduced plaintiff recoveries will be used to reduce premiums, MICRA
contains no provisions requiring insurance carriers to pass on these savings in the form of
lower premiums.
134. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985).
135. See Keene, supra note 118, at 31.
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attorney's fees and costs out of their damage awards, the collateral
source rule provides a closer approximation to full compensation.
"Abolishing the collateral source rule is like saying it's unjustified to
collect on three life insurance policies when the insured only dies
once though the insured has systematically paid the premiums on
those policies."' 13 6
The tortfeasor is given a windfall by being exempted from the
general rule that negligent wrongdoers must fully compensate their
victims. If there must be a windfall, the injured victim should get it,
not the tortfeasor. 137 Abolition of the collateral source rule not only
adversely affects the malpractice victim and the victim's insurer by
requiring the insurer to compensate even though the negligent
tortfeasor is fully. insured, but it will likely result in an increased
insurance burden on the general public. 38
Suggested Revisions
Section 3333.1(a) of the Civil Code allows negligent health care
providers and their insurers to benefit from the foresight of medical
negligence victims who have obtained insurance. If the collateral
source rule is appropriate in general, then it surely is appropriate for
medical malpractice litigation and should not be abolished by
MICRA. If the legislature is intent on invalidating the collateral
source rule solely in the context of malpractice litigation, the defen-
dant should be required to disclose to the judge and jury the amount
of insurance procured to protect against negligence. Because section
3333.1(a) is discretionary, the jury could weigh this evidence in de-
ciding whether or not to reduce the plaintiff's award. 3 9
Another possibility would be to revise section 3333.1(a) so that it
would not apply to an award for future medical expenses. As it pres-
ently reads, the provision allows for the introduction of evidence "of
136. Report of the Commission on Medical Professional Liability, Excerpts from
the Separate Statement of Richard M. Markus (Former President of the Ass'n of Trial
Lawyers of Am.), 1977 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 153.
137. See Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958).
138. See Note, supra note 10, at 948 n.727 (as plaintiffs insurers find themselves
paying off medical malpractice claims, they can naturally be expected to raise their pol-
icy rates to cover the additional burden).
139. The legislature, in making the provision discretionary, likely believed that the
jury would take the plaintiff's collateral benefits into account when assigning a damage
award. This creates a degree of arbitrariness. For instance, when two individuals, simi-
larly situated with respect to injuries and collateral benefits, are before two different
juries, one individual may have his award reduced by the value of his collateral benefits
while the other may not.
any amount payable .. ."140 However, evidence of "amounts paya-
ble" with reference to future medical expenses is speculative. Even if
the victim has insurance at the time of trial, future coverage may not
be accurately predicted. Likewise, the victim may not be working
when the need for future care arises, providing no guarantee of cov-
erage under an employee health plan.
The statute should provide for jury instructions informing the jury
there is a cap on non-economic damages. This would give the jury a
better overall understanding of the plaintiff's true financial situation
when deciding the total amount of damages recoverable.
Section 3333.1(b) of the Civil Code
Section 3333.1(b) 141 bars the plaintiff's collateral source from ob-
taining reimbursement from the medical malpractice defendant. In
effect, the provision shifts the burden of medical malpractice from
the tortfeasor's insurance carrier to the collateral source, whether
that source be the plaintiff's employer, workers' compensation car-
rier, or insurance company. Section 3333.1(b) thus insulates the
health care provider from much of the responsibility for negligence.
The cities that must bear the burden of section 3333.1(b) suffer a
decrease in revenues by not being able to recover their workers' com-
pensation expenditures, or by paying higher premiums for their
workers' compensation insurance.142 Shifting the burden of rising
malpractice insurance costs to cities and other employers is not a
rational way of meeting the goals of MICRA, because both are al-
ready under financial duress due to rising workers' compensation
costs and, certainly for public employers, shrinking budgets.
Where subrogation rights are at issue, the policy question is
whether the tortfeasor should be allowed to shift the burden of pay-
ment to an innocent collateral source. While this is often a question
of which insurance company will bear the loss, the effect of section
3333.1(b) may be more extensive. Because the phrase "collateral
source" is broadly defined in section 3333.1 to include provisions of
the United States Social Security Act and "any state or federal in-
come disability . ..act,1 1 43 the subrogation rights established for
Federal Disability Benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 401, Aid to Families
and Dependent Children under 42 U.S.C. § 601, Supplemental Se-
curity Income for the Blind and Disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 1381,
Medicare under 42 U.S.C. § 1395, and Medi-Cal under 42 U.S.C. §
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985).
141. Id.
142. Barme, 37 Cal. 3d at 184, 689 P.2d at 452, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
143. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985).
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1396 could be impacted.1 ,4 Section 3333.1(b) undermines these fed-
eral programs by contravening the established public policy to shift,
wherever possible, certain public economic burdens to the tortfeasor
or its malpractice insurance carrier. Depriving the malpractice vic-
tim's collateral source of its right to recover tort damages is contrary
to the public policy of the state of California in that it allows the
tortfeasor to avoid responsibility for its own conduct, by shifting the
burden to employers and insurers who never intended to enter the
medical malpractice insurance field.1 45
Suggested Revisions
Section 3333.1(b) should be revised to restore the lien and subro-
gation rights that have already been established under federal and
state statutes and decisions.' 46 If the legislature feels that it cannot
completely restore the subrogation rights of the collateral source, a
partial restoration can be implemented.
For example, plaintiff's insurance company can recover fifty per-
cent of the damage award from the defendant's insurance carrier.
Alternatively, limits can be set within which plaintiffs collateral
source and defendant's insurance carrier can negotiate a settlement.
If plaintiff's collateral source were guaranteed a twenty-five percent
subrogation recovery, but no greater than seventy-five percent, the
two parties could, in many cases, successfully negotiate an out of
144. Appellant's Opening Brief at 20, City of Huntington Park v. Wood, 37 Cal.
3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984).
145. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
146. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971) gives to all employers the statutory
right to sue a third party tortfeasor. California Civil Code § 3333.1(b) denies the em-
ployer his right of action which was established in the Labor Code. While it is true the
legislature has the power to abrogate rights it has previously conferred, it is interesting to
note that no attempt was made by the legislature to amend the Labor Code section, even
though, in implementing the tort reform provisions of MICRA, at least 16 other code
sections were amended.
A direct right of action by the United States government against the tortfeasor, as well
as provisions for subrogation against the injured malpractice victim is provided in 42
U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (1982). California Civil Code § 3333.1(b) will thus create another
subclassification consisting of collateral benefit sources who will be able to recover under
federal statutes.
The State of California has a lien against any personal injury settlement or judgment
for medical expenses paid on behalf of the malpractice victim by the County Welfare
Department through the use of a Medi-Cal card or by the California Department of
Benefit Payments. This lien is authorized under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14124.70-
14124.79 (West 1980).
The private liens of insurance carriers have been upheld in West v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 562, 106 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1973), and in Block v. Califor-
nia Physicians Serv., 244 Cal. App. 2d 266, 53 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1966).
court settlement. This would cut down on litigation expenses, allow a
degree of give and take between the parties, and assure the plaintiff's
collateral source of some measure of recovery.
CONCLUSION
There is a medical malpractice problem in California. It is too
much medical negligence. The legislature should turn its attention to
the root cause of the current malpractice problem: the substantial
number of injuries sustained by patients during the course of hospi-
tal and medical treatment. Statutes should be enacted which are
aimed at improving medical risk control and quality review among
health care providers. MICRA seeks to solve the problem by dealing
with a symptom-high medical malpractice rates' 47-- rather than at-
tacking the cause-medical negligence. The result of the Act is that
the politically vulnerable group of seriously injured medical malprac-
tice victims is made to bear the burden of bringing down the doctors'
insurance rates.
MICRA is an attempt by the California legislature to address is-
sues that are inherent in all personal injury litigation, not merely
medical malpractice. These issues, which include the proper degree
of compensation for negligently caused injury; the method(s) of com-
pensation that should be employed in personal injury actions; and
how plaintiffs' attorneys should be compensated, should not be ad-
dressed narrowly by the legislature, affecting only a small class of
medical malpractice victims. Logically, MICRA should either be re-
pealed (or at least significantly revised), or all personal injury litiga-
tion should be reformed along the same lines.
Most would agree that the latter choice would be a radical and
unjustified departure from our common law tradition. The sweeping
reforms wrought by MICRA, directed solely at the victims of medi-
cal negligence, are likewise unjustified. As James S. Todd, M.D.,
Diplomate of the American Board of Surgery and a Trustee of the
American Medical Association, has said: "[E]fforts directed toward
tort reform and legislative relief must be reasonable and not self-
serving. Malpractice is a medical problem, not a legal one, and those
injured as a result of negligence are entitled to fair and prompt com-
pensation .. 1.. ,148
Louis ARNELL
147. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (demonstrating that medical
malpractice insurance rates are not unreasonably high).
148. Goddard, for the PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEP'T, ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM.,
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION IS WRONG, THERE Is No MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE CRISIS 11 (1985).
